Introduction
. . . we now see a proliferation of discursively constituted and institutionally materialized and embedded spatial scales (whether terrestrial, territorial or telematic), that are related in increasingly complex tangled hierarchies rather than being simply nested one within the other, with different temporalities as well as spatialities . . . There is no pre-given set of places, spaces or scales that are simply being reordered. For in addition to the changing significance of old places, spaces, scales and horizons, new places are emerging, new spaces are being created, new scales of organization are being developed and new horizons of action are being imagined. (Jessop, 2000) . . . globalization should not (as so often happens) be exaggerated or oversimplified. The process has not touched every person, location and sphere of activity to the same extent. It has not been inevitable, linear, irreversible or completed. Globalization has not constituted the sole or primary motor of contemporary history. Place, distance and territorial borders have not ceased to be important in the present time of globalization. The rise of supra-territoriality has not heralded the end of the state. Everyone has not enjoyed equal access to, an equal voice in and equal benefits from transborder relations. Globalization has to date not created a world community with universal prosperity, planetary democracy and perpetual peace. Nor . . . has the process removed cultural differences from the world system. (Scholte, 1996) Territorial structures and the meanings associated with them have changed dramatically over the course of time, reflecting the perpetual regional transformation of economic, political, administrative and cultural practices and discourses, and inherent relations of power. The above quotationswhich are but two examples from a vast literaturedisplay the complexity of the field in front of scholars who are trying to make sense of the changing spatialities of the current world.
Territorial transformations have been particularly intensive in Europe. While the narratives written on the history of Europe are often ready to trace these processes to ancient times, territorial transformations were particularly dramatic during the 20th century and especially since the 1970s. The rise of a 'new Europe', based mainly on the changing face of capitalism and altered relations between national economies and the international market, has simultaneously meant a radical reorganization of geographical scale and demonstrated that scales are not neutral, naturalized givens but materially real frames of social action and products of social activity and struggle (Smith, 1995) . The emergence of the EU provides the most recent and powerful expression of the European politics of scale in the age of globalization. Its relatively short history has not prevented various authors from creating presentist representations of the supposed spatial continuity of this entity and of its 'identity' -whatever this in practice means for various commentators. Questions such as 'What is Europe?', 'What is its identity?' or 'Is Europe a unity?' have frequently been asked, starting at times from its physical geography, at times from human/cultural/ political aspects (Gottmann, 1969) . This mapping has led occasionally to crude generalizations, such as 'Europe is a culture which occupies a culture area' (Jordan, 1973: 6) , which often tend to create oversimplified visions of the existence of both a homogenous European space and culture. However, alternative geopolitical visions of the divisions and constituents of Europe have been put forward in the course of time that have above all reflected the (geo)political contexts in which the authors have themselves operated (Heffernan, 1998) . Morley and Robins (1995) have reminded us that cultural identities should be understood only in and through their relations to the Other(s). They argue that it would be inappropriate to start by trying to define 'European culture' and then compare it with other cultural identities. For almost 3,000 years ideas of Europe have been characterized by difference, whether geographical and/or mythological. One challenge for research is to deconstruct the processes in which the ideas of difference have been created, and to analyse what has been included and excluded at different times in different spatial contexts. One major line in the geopolitical vision has been the relation between west and east (and 'Europe' and Russia), which still crucially shapes the geographical and geopolitical imagination of politicians, economists and academics on both sides of the line that nowadays exists not so much on the ground but rather as a fuzzy frontier in human minds and practice.
Europe, and regions and places inside Europe, are historically contingent social processes that are always part of larger-scale territorial transformations. Regions predated the rise of national states and were then effectively omitted or exploited -depending on context -by the emerging states in organizing the governance and control over territories. Whereas the construction of regions and places then became one part of governance coming more or less 'from above' but still often closely associated with historical and cultural contexts, in the current world regionalization increasingly reflects processes that are associated with the international division of labour, modern technologies and globalizing markets, where social practices and discourses (in economy, governance, culture) occurring at various spatial scales come together in complex ways. This may create regionalist movements in regions where people feel marginalized in terms of economy, culture or political representation.
This paper reflects the discourses on 'Europe' through some key concepts of (political) geographic thinking, particularly region, place and boundary, and through their relations with the concept of identity. All these categories seem to be on the agenda in current debates on European space, but they are often taken for granted. It is typical to suggest that the territory in question -'place', 'region' or state -automatically has a more or less fixed 'identity', which can be defined by using parameters that in fact may illustrate the power of some actors or organizations to inscribe this identity or structure of meanings (or expectations, Paasi, 1986) on people rather than being something that has a permanent essence and that 'belongs' to every citizen. The paper therefore also analyses the development of the images of Europe and narratives on its 'identity' and boundaries, and how these images have implied different forms of spatiality. All collective identities are changing, contested and contextual categories. What we now understand as Europe differs from the Europe of the 1980s, and probably from the Europe of 2010 -where many authors already see a (loose) federal state based on certain political, economic, military and administrative practices and identifications. This will not, however, be a United States of Europe since -I would argue -no author has been able to show how traditional links between (national) states and citizens will be transformed to a higher spatial scale. This transformation would require not only the change of formal, institutional and governmental links -or formal definitions of European citizenship -but also changes in the abstract, psychological and symbolic links and institutions in which the production and reproduction of spatial loyalties and sentiments occurs (Hassner, 1997; Linklater, 1998) . These elements have been effectively monopolized by the state. The members of European 'nations', for instance, speak more than 70 languages, and immigrants and refugees form hundreds of new linguistic communities inside old cultural orders. Most languages and many 'nations' do not, however, have any official status in the system of states. In short, we are dealing with the fuzzy area of culture and identity where various spatial scales come together.
The paper argues that we need to contextualize diverging spatial imaginations historically in order to understand their contested nature. Consequently, this paper scrutinizes the geographies of Europe as a transforming constellation of territories, a spatial field of regions, nested 'places' and changing centres of meanings. It moves on different spatial scales that are always constituted by and constitutive of the social production of spatiality. It starts by mapping some competing visions of Europe and then goes on to reflect the ideas of region and place that could be useful in understanding the forms of spatiality that are relevant in the emerging Europe. Lee (1985) set forth a distinction between different geographical perspectives on Europe that have both expressed and modified the understanding of what Europe is. In his framework, Europe may be understood as an experience, an institution and a structural body. I will follow this three-part division when mapping the contested imaginaries of Europe, but it should be noted that these interpretations are not separate but rather constitutive of each other. Nevertheless, because of the complexity of the existing discourses, it is useful to discuss them separately for analytical reasons.
Mapping Europes

Europe as an experience
Europe may be understood as a specific idea or socio-spatial experience, something that the idea of a 'structure of feeling', coined by Williams (1961) , partly captures. Williams understood the 'structure of feeling' as a culture of a period that structures the understanding of what takes place. What this in principle means is of course a deeply contextual matter in both space and time, and it is shaped by such elements as national media, education systems and identity narratives. These elements, for their part, are shaped by the prevailing economic and political relations.
The 'European consciousness' of the preindustrial period was largely limited to ideas that existed among a narrow intellectual elite (Heffernan, 1998) . These ideas nevertheless greatly contributed to what is nowadays usually understood as the 'European culture'. Europe gradually became part of a wider consciousness during the 18th and 19th centuries (Lee, 1985) . Between the 1830s and 1880s several thinkers, such as Rousseau, Proudhon or Bluntschli, created visions of the theoretical and juridical basis of a federalistic Europe. While some of them argued that national states should be gradually replaced by a union of European nations, the political reality of the 19th century did not promote the idea of Europeanness. Particularly revealing is the comment by Bismarck that 'anyone who speaks of Europe is wrong. Europe is only a geographical notion'. For some others, a Union of European states would have meant a simplification of existing diversity. Nietszche, for his part, suggested that the role of a new 'good', supranational Europe should be that of an interpreter between the east ('Asian profoundness') and the west ('American energetic activity') (Mikkeli, 1997) . One part of the definition -and representation -of Europe has been the effort to define the boundaries of this entity. For hundreds of years geopoliticians have drawn lines of inclusion and exclusion that were based on power politics, culture and even physical geographical arguments (Tunander et al., 1997) . This is also the case with the 'newest' Europe (of integration) which is, as Hassner (1997: 48) argues, 'bound to remain ambiguous in its geographical dimension. It cannot be conceived without borders, but these borders are bound to remain moving and contradictory.' Personal experiences have also always varied. A Swedish writer, August Strindberg (1849 Strindberg ( -1912 , a gold medallist of the Geographical Society of St Petersburg, commented sceptically at the turn of the 20th century that for him the discovery of Europe was the same as it was for 'Stanley to discover Africa . . . [it] was like going through a dark continent' (Mead, 1982) . The idea of Europe as a dark continent has emerged once again during the 1990s, both in the form of terrible ethnic violence and a discursive analysis of these events (Campbell, 1998) . In his metaphoric journey through the dark continent, Strindberg never had to witness the horrors that were just emerging in Europe after his death, at first in the First World War and 20 years later in the Second World War. European conflicts and the rival ideologies of the 20th century -liberal democracy, communism and fascism -were in a key position to shape the content of Dark Continent (Mazower, 1998) . Mazower reminds us that what all ideologies have in common is that they want to represent their own utopia as an 'end of history'. Former utopias are often interpreted as pathologies that are now healed. The EU is currently seen as the collective medicine for the European national states to adapt into global capitalism and competition heralded by a neo-liberalist wave, but 'capitalism does not create feelings of belonging capable of rivalling the sense of allegiance felt by most people to the state in which they live'.
The key message of these brief examples is that each generation -understood as a theoretical category (Mannheim, 1952) -will find its own Europe, and encounter and modify it physically and intellectually. This encounter occurs in a historical matrix modified by former generations: 'We are all forced to live simultaneously in partly common, partly different time-frames and epochs' (Hassner, 1997: 54) . This is inevitably the case with the spatial context, too. Empirical studies show that people living in different states identify themselves with Europe on different grounds (Cinnirella, 1997) .
The reasons for a relatively unclear identity are versatile. Morley and Robins (1995) argue that the European community (common 'home') is vague because of its diversity. In the current situation 'European experience' is still very much a nationbound phenomenon and a common European identity and experience of Europe as a 'place' is -in spite of all festive proclamations -still missing. It will be missing for a long time, since states tend to dominate the production and reproduction of European spaces of identification, even if the spatial scale represented by the state and the EU are in a 'nested' relation where both entities exist simultaneously together with the global, regional and local. How identity and boundary making manifest themselves in culture, politics or economy is a historically and spatially contingent matter, but the production of the scales of identification is a cultural institution. While the contemporary rescaling of states will bring into being new spatial configurations and new links between scales, the modern state still has a considerable 'lead' in the production of scale (Smith, 1995; Brenner, 1999) . If Castells (1998: 268) is correct, this lead will also continue in the future: 'The formation of the European Union . . . was not a process of building the European federal state of the future, but the construction of a political cartel, the Brussels cartel, in which European national states can still carve out, collectively, some level of sovereignty from the new global disorder, and then distribute the benefits among its members, under endlessly negotiated rules. ' Identity is not merely an individual or social category, but also -crucially -a spatial category, since the ideas of territory, self and 'us' all require symbolic, socio-cultural and/or physical dividing lines with the Other. At local contexts solidarity may be based on personal contacts and interaction but larger-scale territories are inevitably 'imagined communities' -the category that Anderson (1991) has reserved to depict nation, solidarity units that are understood as entities that have more or less fixed boundaries and which are maintained by collective institutions such as legislation, administration and education systems. These institutions are important in the signification and legitimation of territoriality. They enter the daily life of citizens when people participate in the reproduction of these institutions but this also occurs in mediated forms through numerous institutions such as the novel, the newspaper and the electronic media. The modern state has been the key medium for the operation of these institutions and exploits them effectively in governance, steering not one-sidedly 'from above' but in a constellation of power where the state operates with organizations/institutions that have their origin at a variety of spatial scales (Pierre, 2000) . States play a significant role in the popular politics of place making and in the creation of naturalized links between places and people, and it is partly for this reason that it is typical to assume that all individuals should be part of a nation and have a national identity and state citizenship (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992) .
This has not prevented various authors from reflecting what this larger-scale consciousness would require in the case of Europe. Wistricht (1994) sets forth in his programmatic The United States of Europe a long list of elements that would be at the core of a common European identity and comments that people in general need 'clear and tangible concepts' in order to develop a sense of belonging. This mixture of elements would combine Roman law as well as Greek thought, Christianity and Renaissance. The experience of a common identity is also modified by decisions that in principle homogenize experience by removing the obstacles to movement of capital, people and goods. These are processes that a state-based nationalism has since the 19th century used to create imagined communities. In the current Europe the removal of these obstacles is leading in the opposite direction, to a deep polarization and unbalanced economic development between states and localities. When this constellation is flavoured by ethnic, racial and religious prejudices, we are probably taking steps away from a common identity.
Wistrich (1994) puts particular stress on the role of education -as every state does (Schleicher, 1993) -and argues that the principal role of European education policy should be to promote better mutual understanding and the growth of a European consciousness (this is what Coudenhove-Kalergi had in mind in the 1930s). Traditional nationalist history teaching has tended to represent neighbours in a hostile manner, participating in the production of the 'territorial trap' (Agnew, 1994) . Wistricht suggests that student exchange programmes could promote certain common forms of consciousness, lowering barriers on a personal level. However, education is one of the fields -like social policy (Golub, 2000) -that have remained very much national questions in the integration process. He further argues that building a European consciousness must extend well beyond education, permeating everyday concerns and interests of citizens, including sport, cultural pursuits and television (Wistricht, 1994: 90) . This means that a common experience would claim a common institutional basis.
Europe as an institution
The dominant image of 'Europe' is currently based very much on the European Union, that is the institutional Europe. It is defined through institutional structures that are constitutive of European economic and cultural integration. The history of the production of these structures is a highly contested one, and new layers of legislation and rhetoric have been created (Heffernan, 1998) . Smith (1995) pointed out how the language of integration is self-evidently technocratic. Its starting point is that European unity is a virtually accomplished fact and an unquestioned good, while the integrationist perspective begins from the perspective of capital. Hence, integration has been above all economic integration. Lee (1985) argues that the totalizing image provided by the institutional Europe either ignores place and time altogether or -at best -treats them as containers abstracted from their social context. During the Cold War period this image arrogantly ignored one half of the European area, since the post-Second World War 'Europe' was equated with the west. Europe was seen as consisting of two halves -the Atlantic Europe or the Europe of the US, and Eastern Europe or the Europe of the Soviet Union (Taylor, 1991) . The image of Europe as a new field of economic and political integration also forgets that integration is not a new phenomenon. Mazower (1998) argues that the 'Europe' of the EU is not a reality, it is rather a promise or delusion. The established geography and existing spatial scales of the institutional Europe are increasingly challenged when new member candidates are knocking at the gates. This is, again, a political and economic process with deep links to the questions of security and a set of choices that will change the material frames of social action, and will produce simultaneously a new platform and container for social activity (Smith, 1995) . This process is a continuation of activities that the EC had carried out since the 1980s to create a framework for trade. Sweden, Finland and Austria changed the existing institutional geography, constellation of power and scale in 1995 but the challenge is even greater with new states that have recently applied for membership. These states represent the former 'Eastern Europe', part of which is now again actively defined as Central Europe, including states like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Even greater will be the challenge with the states in the third 'zone', the eastern periphery (of the west), that have been accepted into negotiations but which face serious problems in their efforts to step into the market economy. In principle the elite in all of these states struggle to redefine the position of their state in the new Europe and to express their identification with new 'European values' and, of course, to gain from integration also in terms of economy and security. In fact, the leaders in many states, especially Poland, are getting nervous because the schedule for expansion is still more or less vague. In the current 'post-wall Europe' (Tunander et al., 1997 ) the states of the former Eastern Europe often find the eastern boundary of Europe form their own western boundary. These processes -as well as the expansion of NATO -are going to change fundamentally the system of 'ins' and 'outs' in the European space (Bort, 1998) , as well as the geopolitical matrices in which Europe is defined and institutionalized in relation to the external world, particularly the USA and Russia.
Europe as a structure
While economists and political scientists have long stressed institutional factors in their discussions on Europe, geographers have by tradition operated at the other extreme and understood Europe in structural terms, endowing primacy 'upon the eternity of the soil' (Lee, 1985: 86) . They have depicted Europe as a physical and human geographic entity. Since the motives of scholars have varied, the results of their spatial imagination and the forms of knowledge they produce have also been very diverse. The tradition of university and school geography has identified Europe as a regional geographic entity, that is one major area among other 'geographical regions'. The criteria for definition emerged from the supposedly 'neutral elements' of nature and culture, often bypassing the (geo)political realities of states. Hence the vision of Europe as the peninsula of the Asian continent extending to the Ural Mountains tended to dominate the representations of geographic textbooks, and contributed to the formation of a specific geographical imagination.
One element in these representations has been various 'sub-European' regional divisions shaping the geographical mosaic of Europe. Geographical textbooks show a huge variety as to the names and shapes of these regions, but along with these divisions terms such as 'Northern Europe', 'Central Europe', 'Southern Europe' and 'Eastern Europe' became part of the terminology of geographers, even if they partly disappeared from the vocabulary during the Cold War. These images have been important in shaping the consciousness of the territorial shape of Europe. This is due to the fact that more than any other images of Europe these have been represented on maps and in textbooks. Maps are deeply ideological in shaping spatial consciousness. While giving explicitly a specific fixed shape to space, they also modify the consciousness implicitly by naturalizing the cultural and culturalizing the natural (Harley, 1988; Wood, 1992) . The ideological element can also be more explicit. Before 1945 it was typical to shape Europe as an entity or as sub-areas, but after then it was commonplace simply to remove some states outside Europe. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union in particular was 'removed' outside Europe proper. Van Valkenburg and Held (1952: 5) , for instance, stated that from the perspective of western civilization the Soviet Union was non-European, not even a pro-Europe-minded state as Russia had been during the period of the Czars. Jordan (1973) constructed an 'index of Europeanness' (from 0 to 12) which showed that the states in Eastern and Southern Europe were not particularly 'European'. The ideological background of this classification is clear. Taylor (1991) found out that the US scored 12 -it was fully 'European' whereas many European states were not.
During the 1960s and 1970s the 'bloc' idea increasingly shaped (geo)political actions, and this geographical imagination also manifested itself in the production of knowledge and in representations of Europe. It became typical to produce specialized textbooks on the geographies of Comecon-countries and the European Community. This is the road we are still partly on (see Cole and Cole, 1997) but the Europe of a broader geographic discourse is a larger one, as can be seen from the collection edited by Unwin (1998) . These examples display effectively the link between knowledge, representation and power, and how 'geography' is actively present in this constellation.
Maps have of course been important in the case of institutional Europe as well. It was typical before 1995, for instance, to represent the Europe of the EC on maps without Scandinavia. Only Denmark was included as a member of the Community. 'Europe' was a process that defined itself and excluded those that were not participating in the process. A fitting illustration is Finland, where a whole discourse emerged about 'entering' into Europe when the state became an EU member in 1995, while nobody in Finland has probably ever thought that the country is not part of Europe. This process is now occurring in the new candidate states as well. Political actors in the former Eastern Europe have been actively defining the meanings of Europe.
Previous examples show that 'regions', regionalizations and the representations of them are made by people and social groups. Regions, their 'boundaries' and symbolic meanings are always social constructs. They are not results of straightforward autonomous and evolutionary processes but usually expressions of a perpetual struggle over the meanings associated with space, democracy, representation and welfare. They may also be the results of struggle over symbolic capital in different social fields, not least in academia. Regions are not results of social processes that occur merely inside regions. Power-holding actors and organizations involved in the production of the territorializations of space may act inside regions but also outside them. While this is what several authors have recently argued in suggesting that regions should be understood as 'networks' based on spatialized social relations and discourses (and that they are social constructs) (Allen et al., 1998) , in fact this idea was already evident in the early 1980s (Pred, 1984; Paasi, 1986) .
Europe as a set of 'regions'
The above analysis of various interpretations of Europe argued that territories, their boundaries and the identity narratives that depict the features of these regions and/or the identification of people with them, are social, political and economic constructs. Nowhere is this clearer than in discourses on the 'Europe of regions'. These entities may -contrary to traditional vernacular regions that emerged from the life of local social communities -be relatively separate from the everyday lives of ordinary people, and the spatial experiences and meanings emerging from these contexts.
In the current debate on Europe, 'regions' are increasingly public representations which literally take place in the sphere of these discourses. These regions are not so much historical and cultural entities, as products of regionalization processes. They exist at first perhaps in the namings, strategic definitions and proclamations of politicians, foreign policy experts and researchers, and may then be gradually transformed into representations on maps and texts (administrative areas, various 'circles', 'bananas', 'learning regions'), and into sets of social (political, economic and administrative) institutions, practices and discourses. In spite of the fact that the expert-language of 'region discourses' may remain abstract for ordinary people, these 'regions' may finally have an effect on how people act in different situations and how they interpret and organize the mosaic of places, regions and boundaries that surrounds them. These regionalizations increasingly cross existing state borders (Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999; Paasi, 1999a) and some authors have been ready to raise regional (cross-border) spaces as the major sites of economic development (Ohmae, 1995) .
The production of space, scales and associated meanings is a perpetual process. Social space, regions and places as well as spatial scales are simultaneously both products and constituents of social action and always reflect asymmetrical power relations or power-geometries (Massey, 1993) , in the sense that some actors are more actively participating in the production of space/scale while most people are 'consuming' and reproducing them. Politicians, business people, actors operating in governance and media, teachers, and researchers are usually in a crucial position in defining, giving shape and meanings to space. This is certainly the case with 'Europe' itself but holds also at lower scales, typically in the field of regionalism where regional(ist) activists are usually very important in the formation of opinions and in mobilizing movements.
Whereas regionalism was originally a national phenomenon, being defensive, integrating or autonomist, since the 1980s regionalism has become more economically oriented and has reflected globalization (Keating, 1997) . European integration has been important to regions and regionalism in terms of economy and politics. It is said that 'regions' are increasingly in competition to attract investment and to gain market share. It is, of course, some actors operating in the regions that do this, not the 'regions'. This is not just a play on words, since the language of regionalism (and its capacity to fetishize space and territory) has always been an important strategy for nationalists and regionalists in constructing spatial oppositions, and it is the key medium when the spatialities of power are hidden in rhetoric.
In the restructured political space, regions are political arenas where regional actors meet. Concomitantly they are 'actors' in national and EU political arenas (Keating, 1997; . New kinds of regionalization also seem to be emerging that are overlapping existing territorial structures. Fitting examples of this more abstract region building are such projects as the construction of the Barents area, the Baltic Sea region or the discourse on the meanings of the 'Northern dimension' in the EU. These have all initially been 'regions in discourses' and 'regions on paper', but they may one day turn into 'regions as social practice' that may have very concrete effects on people's daily lives.
The role of academic research in the production and reproduction of these spaces is problematic, since, especially in applied research, regions are often taken for granted. Some authors reduce the whole problem to the formal, hierarchical (statistical) setting consisting of 15 EU member states, 78 NUTS1, 211 NUTS2, and 1,093 NUTS3 regions. NUTS regions are created on a normative or analytical basis and they serve as a reference point for the collection, development and harmonization of Community regional statistics, for socioeconomic analyses of regions, and for the framing of Community regional policies. Formally, the 'Europe of regions' consists then of administrative regions that are represented in official statistics.
As far as academic research is concerned institutional Europe is increasingly becoming one more example of a 'territorial trap', the category that Agnew (1994) reserved for states, and hence an example of how supra-state political projects may develop state characteristics (Yuval-Davis, 1997) . This means that structural elements and experience are also increasingly swallowed by this entity. Depictions of 'Europe' -for example the frameworks for statistical information regarding this entity -are becoming fixed and self-evident, and the practice and results of research increasingly confirm the existence of a specific institutional Europe. This becomes obvious in studies that take for granted the 'Europe' of European Union and then map the spatial elements of this Europe (Heidenreich, 1998) .
We certainly need statistical information to make comparisons of regional development and to shape policies, but regional research is often problematic. No wonder then that researchers have begun to challenge the understanding of spatiality as a network of given grids, whether they are localities, regions or states. This has occurred not only in political geography (Agnew, 1994) but also in fields such as anthropology (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Appadurai, 1996) and international relations (Shapiro and Alker, 1996) . These discourses have forced us to reflect particularly on the links between state territoriality and territorialities occurring on other scales. This holds in the case of the ideas of region, place, boundary or identity, too -concepts that are often almost a self-evident part of the conceptual apparatus of regional researchers in Europe. One problem is that researchers operateeven in the same academic field -exclusively within their own special areas, while their problems and conceptualizations may be overlapping. I reflect below upon one of these categories, region, starting from the 'Europe of regions'.
The 'Europe of regions'
A lot has been written on European regions and their current and forthcoming roles. The idea of the 'Europe of regions' is of Western European origin and it is currently founded on the need to fill the democratic deficit of the EU. Strong, selfsupporting regions are part of the basic EU ideology regarding spatial planning and structural policy in particular (Vartiainen and Kokkonen, 1995; Keating, 1997) . In the context of the EU the claims about regions and regional autonomy are based on the belief that economic development in regions will depend above all upon the capacity of local initiative to use synergies among local resources (Cappelin, 1995) . The idea of the importance of regions as such is not, however, new, since during the 19th century some authors -such as Patrick Geddes -were propagating regions (Heffernan, 1998) , and regionalism as a way of thinking has a long history (Gilbert and Litt, 1952) .
All European regions -from states to NUTS areas -display an extraordinary variety in their economic development, cultural and political history; and 'identity' as it is stored in documents and lives in collective memory (Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998) . In some states 'regions' are instruments of state power more or less defined 'from above', and while they may be important in governance, they may be culturally 'thin'. In other cases regions may be understood as being deeply historical and cultural entities (thick) whose existence becomes manifest not only in identity narratives but also numerous social and cultural institutions. In the federal states like Germany and Austria the power of regions is strong. In Spain, Italy and Belgium regions also have power. The power of regions has become stronger in France and the Netherlands. As a recent example, the position of Scotland and Wales -which are, in fact, 'nations' -has changed in the UK and hints of an emerging regionalism exist in England (MacLeod, 1998; Tomaney and Ward, 2000; MacLeod and Jones, forthcoming) . However, in Finland, for instance, a century-long political struggle has not led to a democratic regional governance that could mediate between the state and the local state.
While Europe has a highly regionalized economic structure, the roles of regions and their boundaries are increasingly fuzzy since the open international markets put 'regions' (actors operating in regions) increasingly into competition. Many EU programmes strive to promote cooperation between 'regions', in a way creating a small-scale 'foreign policy' to regions and contributing to new forms of regionalization (Keating, 1997; . Due to the fact that a Europe of regions will be a competitive system, there will inevitably be both losers and winners. As Hassner (1997: 48) has indicated, the relationship between centres and peripheries remains ambiguous and mobile at the level of the EU, and new spaces and new distinctions are being created both between and within states. The resulting pattern will be a multidimensional imbalance between places and regions: between states inside the EU (and those applying to join), regions in the states and localities/places inside the regions (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Heidenreich, 1998; Hudson and Williams 1999; Dunford and Smith, 2000) .
Several authors are sceptical regarding the power of regions in Europe, commenting on their weak institutionalization and their relative incapacity to organize the play of economic and social actors (Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998) . Nevertheless most scholars seem to be ready to admit that regions will be important functional and institutional elements in the territorial politics of European states, together with cities and even stateless nations (Keating, 1998) .
What is a 'region'? A conceptual interpretation
'Regions' have become an important topic not only in debates on the future of Europe. A number of geographers have reflected on their general meaning in social and cultural life, particularly since the early 1980s (Thrift, 1983; Pred, 1984; Paasi, 1986; Johnston, 1991; Murphy, 1991) . This interest continues both on a general level and in the context of concrete case-studies (MacLeod, 1998; MacLeod and Jones, forthcoming) . Recently many economic geographers have contributed on this topic. Scott (1998) distinguishes between four scales: global, plurinational, national and regional, and puts particular emphasis on 'regions' as the 'fundamental building blocks or motors of the entire system'. He does not, however, define 'region' in any specific way but understands it as a medium where social, particularly economic, processes occur. Storper (1998) maps the position of regional economies in the globalizing world, but 'region' is also for him the context where social action and processes occur, not something that as such should be problematized. It is not only geographers who have participated in these discourses. The role of regions (and regionalism) in Europe has also been an important source of discourse for political scientists (Keating, 1998; Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998; Linklater, 1998) .
In spite of the current interest in 'regions', surprisingly little attention has been paid to the crucial question of what is a region -what makes it, and how 'regions' operate. It seems to be common to take the idea of the region for granted and instead discuss the social processes occurring in these contexts, rather than theorizing these contexts. It is also still quite common to understand regions as if they were 'actors' capable of doing or changing things. Regions are not, however, independent actors; they exist and 'become' in social practice and discourse. Allen et al. (1998) note that regions are not 'out there', waiting to be discovered, rather they are our (and others') constructions. Some scholars argued during the 1980s that one challenge for researchers is to unpack (or deconstruct) the meaning of regions, rather than to take them as given settings for social interaction (Pred, 1984; Paasi, 1986 ).
'Region', then, appears to be the meeting point of various concepts of space. While the perspectives of authors may vary from the questions of economy (knowledge economy, economic restructuring) to the questions of administration/governance, from culture and identity to the roles of new institutions in regional development, one suggestion that can be made is that the region should not be regarded merely as a passive medium in which social action takes place. Neither should it be understood as an entity that operates autonomously above human beings. Regions are always part of this action and hence they are social constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural and administrative practices and discourses. Further, in these practices and discourses regions may become crucial instruments of power that manifest themselves in shaping the spaces of governance, economy and culture. It is not fruitful to understand regions as isolated from national and supranational environments. Particularly in an internationally networked knowledge society, it is increasingly less satisfactory to focus either on industrialized regions or on global cities as has been the case in much current research (Heidenreich, 1998) .
We can perhaps agree with the traditional argument of geographers that regions are somewhat unique but we should not stop at this argument and take regions for granted. Instead we should search for a basis for comparison by developing abstractions that could make visible the common elements of regions. The construction of regions and territories is part of the perpetual transformation of the spatial system, in which regions emerge, exist for some time and may then disappear. This process may be labelled the institutionalization of regions (Paasi, 1986; . To illustrate the content of this process, it is useful to distinguish analytically between four simultaneous aspects (in practice these elements are always different sides of the same process): the formation of territorial, symbolic and institutional shapes of a region, and its establishment as an entity in the regional system and social consciousness of the society concerned. It is a process through which a territorial unit becomes an established entity in the spatial structure and is then identified in political, economic, cultural and administrative institutionalized practices and social consciousness and is continually reproduced in these social practices.
Territorial shaping Regions always require some kind of boundaries, even if these do not need to be exclusive physical lines as has typically been the case with state territories. Many European scholars currently evaluate the roles of boundaries at various spatial scales. Often this takes place more or less technically, and particularly at the scale of the state a lot of attention is paid to interaction, cross-border cooperation and integration, which implies that the boundary itself is a passive line while processes matter. This has been the vision that has characterized the tradition of political geography. Contrary to this I do not regard borders as fixed lines, but rather discuss them as arising out of processes in which territories and their contested meanings are socially and culturally constructed. It is important to note that boundaries are not located merely on the border area but everywhere in a society, in diverging social practices and discourses. This also means that the scale of the state manifests itself on other scales as well (Paasi, 1991; .
While state boundaries are usually strictly controlled and visualized, sub-state and supra-state boundaries may be less dominating. In fact this boundedness may well be based on symbolic and cultural -even invisible -lines. While some authors are now ready to argue that boundaries are not important in making regions and that they are rather networks (Allen et al., 1998) , this is hardly true if we understand regions as sources of meaning and identification. A number of authors in different fields have emphasized the close links between boundaries and identity (Mach, 1993; Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995) , but none of them argues that these boundaries should be totally exclusive. Conversi (1995) suggests that boundaries are of vital importance to all human processes, both at the individual and social level. Boundaries are not passive, 'natural' dividers between social entities. Individuals and communities use their qualities to create inclusions and exclusions, divisions between 'us' and 'them', between those who belong and those who do not (Bauman, 1990) . Cohen (1985) discussed the symbolic aspects of community boundaries and argued that in so far as one aspires to understand the importance of community in people's experience, a symbolic perspective is the most significant. People make themselves aware of their culture when they stand at its boundaries (Cohen, 1982) . While this comment is not without its problems (we may ask who defines and what is [national] culture?), the importance of symbolism finds expression in the fact that many authors have discussed the social construction of individual and community life. Rose (1995) argues that boundaries have a dual role in the construction of the 'sense of place'. First they work to establish insiders who belong to the place; second they establish outsiders, who do not belong. This is not a truism, since the division between the established and outsiders is a universal theme. Members of groups often think of themselves in human terms as better than others and, therefore, seem to establish boundaries between groups (Elias, 1994) . International relations scholars have shown the meanings of boundaries in foreignpolicy rhetoric and in narratives of (national) identity (Campbell, 1992; Zalewski and Enloe, 1995; Shapiro and Alker, 1996) . Boundaries should thus not be taken for granted, as self-evident constituents of a 'territorial trap' (Agnew, 1994) . Neither should they be understood as having some universal, independent causal power. Rather they are social and political constructs which are established by human beings for human purposes and whose establishment is a manifestation of power and a social division of labour. Boundaries also mediate contacts between social groups, and not only separate them. All this means that while the disappearance of boundaries (and the state) is a popular theme in much current research, we cannot 'write' boundaries away in our academic discourses as seems to be the case in ultra neo-liberalist manifestos (Paasi, forthcoming) . What we can do is to re-conceptualize them to understand the functions and meanings they have played in the construction of 'territorial traps' at various spatial scales.
Symbolic shaping Symbolic shaping is also crucial in the institutionalization of all regions. I have emphasized previously the meaning of naming as the process that enables the use of regions in political, academic or everyday discourses (Paasi, 1996) . Political elites everywhere have put labels on concrete and symbolic 'landscapes' to divide and control space and people. Spatial labels are also crucial in signifying territoriality. Symbolic shaping includes also many other elements, not only names. Coats of arms, flags, rituals such as parades, and so on are of crucial importance, in the same way that songs, poems, novels and movies make spatial symbolism part of daily life, transforming this symbolism as an essential part of what Billig (1995) labels banal nationalism. Some of these symbolizations may be expressions of the territorialization of memory and the past, others may emerge from current life. In the contemporary world and in many European contexts various actors (mainly politicians and entrepreneurs) strive to create new symbolic meanings for localities and regions to promote their economic success and the supposed 'difference' is then transformed into a commodity in the tourist industry. 'Culture' is one of the keywords in this place promotion, where local resources and culture are transformed into a selective heritage (Ashworth, 1995) . The invention of symbolism is a process that is going on at the scale of 'Europe' as well. A common currency, the 'Euro', might be among the most important symbols in the future, since currency has by tradition been not only an instrument of the national economy in modern states but also one of the major elements in national iconography.
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not enough in making regions. Also needed are institutions (political, economic, cultural) and even formal organizations (such as administrative bodies) that are capable of maintaining and reproducing territoriality and inherent symbolism. Some institutions may have a longue durée. Examples of such institutions are firms, educational bodies, administrative organizations, and the media. Some others may operate more on an ad hoc basis (cultural events). The depth of territoriality in the operation of these institutions may also vary. Some institutions are explicitly bound with maintaining territoriality (Army, Police, border guards), others (schools, media) do this mainly through the slow processes of spatial socialization (Paasi, 1996) . Some institutions may promote culture, some the economy and still others governance. Various combinations also exist; the promotion of economic life is currently effectively combined with cultural policy in many regions.
Regions may become established, that is to say achieve a recognized position in the territorial structure and social consciousness. An established region is then identified in various spheres of social action and discourse, both inside the region and outside. This requires (usually) strong media in the production and maintenance of territorial 'order' and meanings. In the case of a state, establishment usually occurs when its sovereignty is recognized. Administrative regions, for their part, may gain formal status in the administrative territorial system. However, some regions may have a strong cultural position and identity in the spatial consciousness of citizens (and outsiders) even if they do not have any formal role in territorial administrative structures. It is nevertheless usual that regions must become established before they can become instruments in the struggle over social and economic power and resources, for instance in regional policy (Paasi, 1991) . In contemporary Europe deeply institutionalized regions with a strong 'performance' are significant, since many activities constituting regions are increasingly exposed to international competition over resources (Tomaney and Ward, 2000) .
The institutionalization of a region usually means at the same time the de-institutionalization of the previous territorial order and regions. This may occur in the form of concrete territorial changes or symbolic ones. This has been visible in the recent transformations of the Eastern European space and its contested representations in relation to traditional Western European ones. Deinstitutionalization may be seen also in the fact that some regionalist movements and forms of activism have declined in Europe (Le . The formation and dissolution of territories, and hence also the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of their boundaries, is taking place all the time and on all spatial scales, being just as observable at the local, regional or national level as it is on a broader scale. Further, these processes/scales are usually deeply intertwined.
Notes on spatial identity
Speculation on the meanings of contemporary Europe have been part of the problem of how to deal with the (rhetoric of) global flows and cultural closure at various spatial scales. These themes have become popular along with Castells's (1989; ideas about the rise of the space of flows that will challenge the space of places. In the fields of critical geopolitics and international relations, some scholars have become increasingly interested in this 'fast geography' that challenges traditional forms of territoriality. Most working in continental Europe, however, seem to understand the transformation of the world through a 'slower geography' where territoriality and spatially bounded loyalties persistently shape the politics and daily lives of ordinary people -which nevertheless takes place in a globalizing world (Heffernan, 1998) . The idea of flows is not a totally new one. Hudson (1988) commented a decade ago on the dual role of localities from the perspective of economic flows. Whereas localities represent abstract space for capital, points which are evaluated solely in terms of their capacity to yield profits, for the individuals living in these localities they are places where they are born, go to school, meet friends and pursue various social activities. They are meaningful contexts where they have been socialized as human beings and with which people often become deeply identified.
Identity is a word that is often associated with 'regions' and 'places'. What then is 'identity'? Meyer and Geschiere (1999) identity seems to be so important a category for current social scientific and cultural research. They comment how identity seems to have become an inevitable analytical tool in grasping how globalization reinforces the production of cultural difference (not homogenization). They also point to the double charge of the notion of identity. This category refers to people's attempts to fix the world of flows and mark boundaries in the ongoing flux of globalization processes, but it also relates to the nostalgia of social scientists for the times when it seemed possible to isolate bounded social formations or communities.
Much empirical evidence exists which shows that people's awareness of being involved in openended global flows appears to motivate a search for fixed orientation points and frames of action (Meyer and Geschiere, 1999) . Further, this activity also seems to generate determined efforts to affirm old and to construct new boundaries. This harks back to a long line of discussion concerning the link between identity and boundaries which often makes, when universalizing this link, the question of spatial scale disappear. The modern state in particular seems to have followed this method in the territorial control of space, emphasizing universal elements in the principle of territorial sovereignty, hence representing the state as 'the' territory with which to identify.
While identity is often among the taken-forgranted categories that social and cultural scientists tend to criticize, this should not lead us to abandon the whole notion but rather to deconstruct the category in a territorial context. As Billig (1995) has reminded us, it is important to analyse what it means to talk about identity, that is identity can be understood as a kind of (ideological) discourse that exists as part of the territorialized rhetoric of elites and also as part of popular discourses.
Identity discourses are very popular in Europe and actors in various regions try to promote the 'identity' of their regions. Identity is also supposed to play a very important role in political mobilization and regionalism. A 'European identity' is now on the agenda in many fields, and the phrase yields almost 5,000 web pages in a simple search. A glance at these pages shows that the phrase is topical in many institutional spheres: in academic studies, education, cultural organizations and various discussion groups. However, the topics seem to vary from mapping the potential elements of European identity to the problems that various groups of immigrants have faced when entering this institutional structure. Competing discourses on what European identity means have also emerged. This is inevitable since all collective identities at all spatial scales are political constructs and include decisions and definitions on behalf of groups of people. As we saw above, most cultural traditions seem to embrace dualistic ideas about 'us' and the 'Other' that are employed in the construction and representations of identity and difference. These dualisms seem to be particularly important in the European tradition and cultural heritage, and dichotomies such as 'us' and 'them', true and false, friends and enemies, good and bad, past and present, private and public seem to characterize the tradition of the European discourse (Dalby, 1990; Robins and Morley, 1993; Castells, 1998) .
Social constructions of 'we' typically reflect diverging interests while the dominating hegemonic identity often tends to supercede minor voices. Identities are context-dependent and may also change. This is often based on the fact that identities -that are typically social narratives (Somers, 1994) -are usually fused with perpetually changing social practices and rituals, and thus subject to changes. Further, definitions and narratives of identities are always acts of power, since these acts create a discursive, fixed shape to fuzzy and perpetually changing elements. This is particularly clear in the case of 'regions', 'places' and other territorial identities, which are typically ascribed, collective identities. People may identify with them or not, and this can potentially be political dynamite. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of ethno-nationalist violence that aims at changing existing territorial identity structures.
It is useful to make an analytical distinction between the identity of a specific territory, and the regional identity of the inhabitants or regional consciousness (Paasi, 1991; . The former points to narratives, symbols and practices that are associated with a specific territory, whether depicting its nature, landscapes, history, or population. This is the 'story' of a region that is given to citizens in the media and through schools. It is an image of a community of 'we' that may be labelled as an 'ideal' or written identity. On the other side we have 'factual' identities that may manifest themselves in various ways in civil society. A typical form is regional(ist) activism of certain actors. This activism, for its part, may of course produce visions of a (utopian) 'ideal' identity that manifests itself in the media (Paasi, 1986) . Ideal identity is only one element in the complicated constellation of identifications that people may have, based on such elements as class, gender, generation, ethnic background or religion. Some of these identifications, for their part, may be associated with a specific territory, some with other territories, while some may be non-territorial. The key idea of nationalism as a major territorial ideology is to suppose a homology between these two identities, which means that identity is strongly associated with boundaries and exclusion. The contemporary world, however, is increasingly characterized by the 'cartographies of diaspora' and contested identities (Brah, 1996) .
While the narratives of globalization challenge the roles of states and boundaries, the perpetual power of the state is based on institutions that concentrate on reproducing the state as a territorial container and as an ideological entity consisting of institutionalized practices. In spite of all tendencies towards the erosion and re-scaling of the statecentred configuration of capitalist territorial organization, the state still controls social practices and the ideological 'apparatus' that link these practices together. Ideologies are not operating above the heads of people and manipulating them. Instead, many of them are deeply institutionalized and are based on trust and symbolic exchange between the collective and individuals where both parties feel that they benefit from this exchange (Paasi, 1999b) . Strong regionalist/nationalist movements are indicative of the lack of this trust, which usually follows from political, economic and cultural marginalization.
Deconstructing spatial identity
I have argued elsewhere that there is no such general, essentialist phenomenon as 'national identity'. What identity narratives mean in various contexts, and how and in what social and cultural practices they are manifested, is always a constellation of general and contextually unique elements (Paasi, 1999a) . National identity means different things in different spatial and temporal contexts and discourses. I will briefly discuss the elements of national identity to show how complicated the question of European identity is.
To be meaningful for social communities, all identity discourses at all spatial scales must include a temporal and a spatial element, often intertwined. The first element is the territorialization or spatialization of the community, which points to the construction and reproduction of territoriality in cultural, environmental, security or other discourses. This element is strongest in the case of national communities where both nationalism and national identity discourses are linked with territory and territoriality. This accentuates the role of boundaries in communicating the inclusive and exclusive forms of territoriality that in turn become part of the 'social glue' in the integration of the social community (Newman and Paasi, 1998) . Second, most territorial identity discourses include the temporalization of the community, that is the narratives and memories of the past, images of the present and often utopias of the future. This is again most evident in the case of national states. Spatial and temporal dimensions come together in the symbolic narratives and material iconographies of a social community. It is within the context of these general dimensions that the other 'building blocks' of identity discourses and practices may be distinguished. Such building blocks usually include elements such as:
• a material-morphological basis (physical nature and landscape, often transformed into the 'national landscapes' of literature, painting and poetry) • the history of human-nature relations, which in national narratives often manifests itself in teleological explanations as to how we have come to be what we are; these narratives create a common purpose and destiny for the social collective • communal institutions in the fields of economics, administration and governance, politics, and culture, and traditions that create continuity, social order and security for the community • territorial symbolism, which includes the symbolic boundaries between 'us' and the Other • values and norms governing the social existence of the (national) community in question • at times conflicting narratives of 'us' and 'our' identity that are typically produced and reproduced by the national literature, newspapers and education (see Paasi, 1999a; .
The prerequisites for a specific socio-spatial consciousness and identity are weak in Europe, since both the territorial, symbolic and institutional shapes of this entity are unclear. In all European states people have been much more effectively socialized into their own (national) state identities than into a European identity and at times (ethno-) regional identities are important. Both the supporters and critics of the EU have been concerned with its apparent lack of a strong sense of identity and political community, partly emerging from its 'democratic deficit', the gap between its bureaucracy and population (Entrikin, 1999) . No wonder then that competing discourses exist on what 'European identity' means. These discourses are examples of the experience of Europe and they inevitably reflect different interests, which are context dependent. We have seen above that these competing images are not new since various actors have written and drawn various 'Europes' on maps and documents that have also to some extent become part of material practice, the social production of European space. The European Union itself is the best example of this production. In this process the traditional geographical (structural) images of Europe as an entity have been pushed aside, or they are used as the geographical constituents of the institutional Europe. Europe is understood increasingly as the European Community and, more specifically, an arena of economic integration. Ashworth (1995) has suggested that if some kind of continental unity and identity is to be achieved, national identity has to make some concessions to accommodate a wider scale. His argument is that since spatial identities are typically based on creating a past (heritage) for the regions in question, a new Europe will require a new heritage. Such an element is largely missing even if numerous international institutions and organizations exist to promote and maintain heritage. One field where heritage has been effectively exploited is tourism. Hence Europe requires an invention of tradition as has typically occurred in the making of nations (Hobsbawm, 1983) . One obstacle for the inventors is that there exists already a fixed and localized heritage apparatus that is usually interpreted through national states. Place marketing in cities, for example, strives usually to promote tourism and culture as well as to encourage the external capitals to local markets.
While the EU is now the most important political actor in Europe, it is taking steps to achieve a more important global role outside politics and the economy. One increasingly important field is foreign and security policy that in principle will hollow out the practices that traditional state-centred thinking has dominated. Territorial loyalties in Europe -as elsewhere -have been very much monopolized by the state. Nowhere has state territoriality been more explicit than in the case of armed conflicts where the principle of offering one's life for the sake of the state dates from the Middle Ages (Gottmann, 1973) . It is still one of the most highly respected narratives and practices through which the boundedness of territory perpetually becomes part of the ideological landscapes of what Billig (1995) labels banal nationalism. War has been a crucial element in the creation, ritualization and transformation of national identities into spatialized memories as well as in shaping the international relations between states (Comaroff and Stern, 1992) .
The end of the Cold War has changed the functions of the military, and European security policy has changed from traditional territorial thinking, based on sovereignty and realism. Now human rights, democracy, trade and the market economy are the keywords (Rosenau, 1997) . This again forces us to reflect on the meanings of spatial scales. While Rosenau argues that few, if any, societies are likely to dismantle their armed forces, it seems that the 200-year-long period of mass-armies is coming near to its end in Western Europe. In Britain and Ireland military service is on a voluntary basis. In Germany, Belgium, France, Denmark and the Netherlands less than half of each relevant age group goes into military service. In Portugal and Spain military service will become voluntary. In Sweden, Norway, Italy and Austria general conscription will probably be abandoned in the next 10-15 years. In states like Finland the situation is very likely going to remain as it is, in that compulsory service is motivated by old 'national' images of threat, boundaries and a non-allied tradition. In Europe the states that have changed towards a voluntary basis are typically NATO members. This organization will affect the forthcoming spatialities of Europe since several states of the former Eastern Europe are already its members while they are only negotiating on membership of the EU. Indicative of the changing constellation of military power is the fact that representatives of the USA and Turkey expressed their eagerness to participate in the EU decisionmaking processes during the EU and NATO joint meeting in September 2000.
From bounded spaces to open places
Territorial state containers are increasingly leaking and different territorial strategies exist concomitantly in the spheres of economy, culture and military activities (Taylor, 1994) . Most definitions of 'region' and 'place' still (at least implicitly) begin from an assumption that these are specific bounded entities, whether they are constituted in economic processes, social interaction, social identification or even all of these processes at the same time. While we saw above that it is typical to assume that identity and boundaries are two sides of the same coin, 'identity' does not inevitably need to be based on a bounded experience.
Since leaving behind the last remnants of Ratzelian ideas of boundaries as the 'membranes' of the organistic state after the Second World War, political geographers have long understood boundaries as lines that are located between power structures (sovereign states), and they have then mapped their nature, evolution and character, border crossings and links between boundaries and conflicts. As suggested above, boundaries are not merely physical, empirical lines or zones that can be frozen on maps and atlases as naturalized entities. Instead they are social, cultural and political constructs that are made meaningful and exploited by human beings as part of the institutionalization process of territories. Boundaries, territorial symbolism and institutions that maintain and reproduce these very elements are, in a way, divergent sides of the same process of territory production. Hence, boundaries exist in diversified social practices and discourses, and they may at times be strongly symbolized, at times not. Their meanings are not created only locally at border areas but in social practices and discourses that may have their origin at varying spatial scales, most typicallybut not exclusively -at national centres. Boundaries are thus institutions and symbols that are sedimented in numerous territorial practices, discourses and symbols all over the territory, not only in the border areas (Paasi, 1996; . The production of meanings occurs not only in the framework of existing states but in supranational contexts as well. In Europe, for instance, the European Union as a spatial scale and institutional context has been a critical factor in re-shaping the meanings attached to boundaries, some of them being open (particularly the boundaries of the Schengen agreement), while others have been relatively closed (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1996; Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999) . It is paradoxical, as Foucher (1998) reminds us, that Europe, the Old Continent, is the newest of all as far as its boundaries are concerned. More than 60 percent of its present boundaries have been drawn during the 20th century.
Boundaries, territory and identity are often linked together as if they would overlap in a harmonious way to form a 'cultural area'. While this may be true in some cases, this link is certainly not universally valid. State boundaries in particular are often contested, since the boundaries of territory and the social identities of the inhabitants do not always coincide. While the present world harbours some 190 states, there are perhaps 500-600 ethnic groups, perhaps even 5,000 'nations' that may have diverging bases for their identification (Schaeffer, 1997) . Spatial scale makes a difference, too. As Smith (1996: 454) reminds us, 'the boundaries of nations and national states may be determined by military, economic and political factors, but their significance for their inhabitants derives from joys and sufferings associated with a particular ethnoscape', that is an ethnic and social landscape. There are inevitably differences between local and national forms of identity and how spatiality or territoriality is constitutive for other forms of identity -for instance, gender, ethnicity, generation, class -which may exist concomitantly in overlapping forms. These forms become fused at local scale, in the nationalization of everyday life (Paasi, 1999b ideologies are the major context for understanding contested identity discourses. One problem is that identity is a word with positive connotations, and boundaries, therefore, are often seen as positive elements since they are one part of identity production. Boundaries may therefore become mystified and ideological instruments of power, where exclusive lines are drawn in the name of the identity of hegemonic social groups. It is therefore reasonable to search for new interpretations for the idea of place.
Like region, place has also been among the key categories in recent debates on the changing spatialities of Europe. Scholars regard places more often than not as social constructs and argue that places should be understood as networks where socio-spatial processes occurring at various scales come together, rather than being closed, bounded units distinguished by purity and exclusiveness. Power relations are a major element in the construction of place. Massey (1995) in particular has strongly argued that we should understand places -that exist at all spatial scales -not as strictly bounded entities but rather as open constellations of social relations that cross boundaries in many ways. She notes that places do have boundaries around them but also makes some reservations regarding their nature. First, boundaries do not embody any eternal truths of places. Rather they are socially constructed and power relations are decisive for their constitution. This means that the 'truths' too can change. Second, boundaries inevitably cross some other social relations that may be momentous in the construction of social space. Spatial scales are fused in places and boundaries become more flexible and overlapping. Third, boundaries matter, because they are a means of organizing social space -they are, in fact, part of place making. This comment is significant since boundaries have been of vital importance, for instance in nation-building processes. They still are, and nationalism and national identity discourses often exploit boundaries very effectively. Fourth, she reminds us that the drawing of boundaries is always an act of power.
The processes of spatial movement, interaction and communication challenge the practices and processes through which borderlands and boundaries are maintained. Growing flows of refugees and immigrants, perhaps more than anything else, seriously call into question traditional national(-state) centred identities and narratives of nationally bounded places. Many immigrants persistently keep ties with their cultural backgrounds and spatial contexts ('homelands'), showing forms of nationalism that inevitably create transnational social spaces that may vary from families that cross borders to larger-scale refugee diasporas (Faist, 2000) .
Not all parties in Europe have been satisfied with the consequences of integration, and the opposition has focused on images such as the lack of jobs and the costs of social welfare. All over Europe there have been various nationally based reactions against immigration, which have been mixed with racial exclusivity. At the European scale this has been associated with an increased policing of external boundaries of the EU, while the internal barriers have become lower. 'Fortress Europe' has become a popular phrase to display the security fears of politicians, policymakers and the populace, and its implications have been claims for more restrictive immigration policies. These have been associated with the rise of the borderless internal market in Europe and its external boundaries (Faist, 2000) . The emergence of right-wing movements in European Union countries -and in many of those that are negotiating to get into the EU -shows that the links between (a bounded) space, culture and politics are still full of political dynamite. It also shows how various spatial scales come together in the changing geographies of inclusion and exclusion.
Altogether in seven of the fifteen EU member states, extreme right-wing movements have gained substantial political support. Similarly in eight of ten states applying for EU membership, these movements have attracted support. In some countries (Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland) this support is close to zero, but in Italy and Austria it has been almost 30 percent and in France and Belgium around 10 to 15 percent. In Austria, images of external threat provided by immigrants have been channelled into political action. While this image is typically associated with Jörg Haider and his extremist party (FPÖ), in fact the background for this 'fortress Austria' phenomenon has been created by social democrats and conservatives in their joint cabinets since the beginning of the 1990s (Katz, 2000) . FPÖ's programme in particular puts stress on the ideology of 'homeland' (Heimat) and exploits the idea of a nested, exclusive territorial identity. Of those countries commencing negotiations with the EU, in Turkey the level of extreme right-wing support has been 18 percent and in Slovakia and Romania almost 10 percent. Switzerland and Norway, which have stayed outside the EU, also have high support, the former 24 percent and the latter 15 percent.
However, one part of the opposition has challenged existing ideas of nationalism that believe the national state is a political unit that should be congruent with nation. This reaction is linked with ethnic revival. Smith (1992) has set forth three elements that serve as a background for this critique. First, contrary to all arguments announcing the death of the national state, the latter has become extremely powerful since 1945, both as an international actor and in the society within its boundaries. The power, scope and capacity of the state for intervention in every sphere of social life have increased dramatically since the Second World War. Second, the spread of literacy and the mass media all over Europe (and elsewhere), even to the remotest hinterlands, has raised the level of consciousness and expectations of minorities. They are usually almost immediately aware of national protests and movements that occur in neighbouring territories. Third, the impact of public, mass education systems may be divided: it may unite a given national population into a single civic culture but it may also create divisions along pre-existing ethnic lines. Smith (1992: 63) writes that:
By forcing all its different peoples to employ a single civic language and by preaching allegiance to national symbols and historical myths, the state's elites may actually stir up resentment and bitterness at the neglect of minority cultures and the suppression of minority peoples' histories. The latter have not been entirely forgotten among the relevant people themselves; they remain embedded in separate folklore, customs, myths and symbols.
Strong minority identities and perceived oppression have featured as the background to struggles in many European areas. At times ethnicity has taken violent forms (the Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Corsica), at times it has manifested itself in peaceful ways (Scotland, or the Sami population), but in both cases it has challenged the self-evidence of existing territorial traps.
This forces us to reflect on the links between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship, and, more broadly, on the future of political community and democracy. Although the national state will be powerful in the future, it is equally clear that democratic societies and cosmopolitan communities will require increasing openness and 'crossings' of cultural, symbolic, legal and physical boundaries between states (Held, 1995; . The link between citizenship and sovereignty, as well as the central role of national identity to political community, will be challenged. Entrikin (1999) has aptly reminded us that the moral significance of place becomes evident when places are conceived not as locations in space but rather as related to individual subjects. It is through the latter that place draws together the object realms of nature, society and culture. While place has been by tradition associated with the local and particular, a serious challenge is posed to this idea by understanding it as a process mediating the particular and the universal (Entrikin, 1999) . Appadurai (1996; also Isin and Wood, 1999) reminds us that if nations are 'imagined communities', it is the same imagination that will have to carry us beyond the nation to search for nonnational, transnational, or postnational markets for loyalty. This simply means that we should be ready to deconstruct the constitutive, often mystified, elements of spatial identities and territoriality. We have to show that the identities of places -on whatever scale -are never 'pure' (Sibley, 1995) . While identity seems to be based on differentiation from Others, we are forced to ask in the increasingly globalizing world: 'Must it necessarily be a differentiation which takes the form of opposition, of drawing a hard boundary between "us" and "them", in other words the geography of rejection?' (Massey, 1995: 67) .
Place as the spatiality of experience
The perpetual striving to redefine 'spatial categories' such as region, place and boundaries reflects a search for making sense of the rapid changes occurring in the dialectic between spatial structures, social relations and meanings. New definitions also reflect perpetual changes in understanding changing forms of territoriality and spatial life. Redefinitions of spatial concepts have been important elements in the current discourse on Europe, often linked with ideas of identity. Europe is experiencing a dramatic change in its institutionalization: territorial shapes are being sought, symbols are under construction and institutions are in the making at all spatial scales. As Anderson (1995) -among many others -writes, globalization and the EU have gradually changed traditional and established fixed forms of territoriality. He uses the metaphor of 'new medievalism' to emphasize that the current territorial system is characterized by overlapping authorities and loyalties.
An important question, then, will be how identity and boundaries are related. Are identities and territories understood as being strictly bounded or more open? Entrikin (1999) has reflected on the dimensions of place, using the EU as his main example. He argued that a more cosmopolitan view is needed instead of the established, bounded and exclusive concept of place, a view that would balance the particularistic and universalistic dimensions of place. This is a challenge in the present-day Europe where social processes and identity narratives manifesting themselves at diverging spatial scales will become increasingly fused as a consequence of political and institutional transformations and the re-scaling of the state, and where the growing flows of refugees and immigrants seriously call into question both the traditional national(-state) centred identities and narratives of nationally bounded cultures, and local contexts of identity formation.
In the current situation a more radical view is needed, instead of established concepts of place. This can be done by understanding place as a cumulative archive of personal spatial experience, which is not bound up with some specific location as is suggested by the long tradition and even more recent, progressive ideas of place (Massey, 1995; Entrikin, 1999) . This means that 'place' (= the spatiality of personal life) is separated analytically from one specific location. In the contemporary world people increasingly change their spatial locations as (im)migrants, guest workers, refugees and asylum seekers. They experience space as tourists and through various media. In many states people increasingly cross borders by using internet connections. This means that the spatial identities of human beings are by necessity changing elements or 'hybrids'.
Whereas place is best understood as an individual category (but not in the rather narrow location-bound sense as in humanistic geography), an analytic distinction between place and region renders possible an understanding of the multidimensionality of spatiality which is usually lost in narratives that use these concepts without any theoretical distinction. This has been a typical problem in the new regional geography (Paasi, 1996) . Regions/territories, from local scale to states, for their part, are collective institutional structures that are conservative, bounded and change relatively slowly. This is particularly true in the case of states that perpetually exploit the ideology of nationalism to construct loyal citizens (and a 'nation'), ultimately ready to offer their lives to secure their imagined communities. This occurs also on the regional and particularly the local scale where people have attacked immigrants and refugees in the name of local identity and 'purity' -at the same time as the actors in localities increasingly compete in producing images that would attract capital. A challenge for spatial research is to reflect how 'regions' and 'places' come together and what kind of spatial imaginaries, ideologies and institutions are involved in the process of making and understanding them as bounded units at diverging scales. If boundaries and identity are two sides of the same coin, as many have argued, the crucial question is how we could lower the boundaries to promote tolerance and democracy. Citizenship has been central to the politics of inclusion and exclusion in modern states but the boundaries of postnational citizenship are fluid (Soysal, 1997; Isin and Wood, 1999) . Therefore we have to ask, how new supra-, sub-and non-state locations for citizenship can be organized that do not ignore human diversity, and realize that states are not the only actors that have the right to define the moral aspect in international relations (Linklater, 1998) .
